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PRODUCTS LIABILITY WITHOUT PRIVITY:
CONTRACT WARRANTY OR TORT
FRED A. DEWEY *
The recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Mendel
v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,' involves serious implications which may
impede the growth and development of the law of strict product or
enterprise liability.
Stripped of collateral issues, the case impliedly holds that the de-
fendant, Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, who had manufactured and
installed a defective glass door at the entrance to a bank, was liable for
breach of warranty to the plaintiff who, while entering the bank, was
injured when the door struck her and caused her to fall and sustain
personal injuries. However, the majority opinion, written by Judge
Scileppi, held that the applicable statute of limitations had expired
before the plaintiff was injured, and thus before the cause of action
could be brought, and therefore denied recovery. The dissenting opin-
ion, written by Judge Breitel and concurred in by Chief Judge Fuld
and Judge Gibson, argued that the plaintiff's action was in tort and that
the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the plaintiff was
injured.
The case turned on which of two statutes of limitations was control-
ling -the one applicable to an action on a contractual obligation, ex-
press or implied, or the one applicable to personal injuries arising from
tort. The majority opinion in Mendel relied on the case of Blessington
v. McCrory Stores Corp.2 in holding that the provisi~p applicable to an
action on a contractual obligation was controlling.3UIn arriving at this
conclusion, the Court appears to have overlooked several pertinent con-
siderations that made the holding in Blessington inapplicable. First, at
the time Blessington was decided, privity of contract was required and
the action allowed was against an immediate vendor, not against a
remote supplier.4 Hence, it was quite logical to treat an obligation
*Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. College of Law. B.A., University of Iowa,
1931; J.D., University of Iowa, 1933; LL.M., Columbia University, 1934.
125 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969).
2 805 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953).
3 CIVIL PRAcTICE ACT § 48(1). The Court apparently overlooked subdivision 3 of that
section, which provided a six-year limitation for "an action to recover damages for per-
sonal injuries, except in a case where a different period is expressly prescribed in this
article." See 28 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. 127, 128 n.3, 129 (1953). The Civil Practice Act is no
longer operational in New York and has been superseded by the Civil Practice Law and
Rules (CPLR).
4 Although the walls of the citadel had been undermined through the third-party
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arising from an implied warranty to a person in privity with the seller
as one arising from a contractual obligation. Second, the alternative
statute of limitations considered by the Court specifically applied to
personal injuries resulting from negligence.5 Moreover, the appellee in
Blessington had conceded that the lower court had properly dismissed
his negligence counts against the manufacturer, the manufacturer's
supplier of the defective goods and McCrory." Third, the Court was
not required, as in Blessington, to choose between a limitation appli-
cable to an action arising from a contractual obligation and one arising
from negligence. Instead, the available choice in Mendel was between
a limitation applicable to an action arising from a contractual obliga-
tion7 and one applicable to an action to recover damages for a personal
injury"
It appears, therefore, that the Mendel Court erred in applying the
limitation applicable to contractual obligations; first, because the plain-
tiff was a total stranger to the sales transaction, and second, because the
more specific statute applicable to actions for personal injuries should
have taken precedence over the more general one.
The significant aspect of Mendel, however, is the Court's treatment
of the right of a person injured by a defective product to recover from
the manufacturer-seller of the product as a right grounded in contract
warranty even though there was a total lack of privity between the
manufacturer and the injured person.
While the New York Court originally led the way in piercing the
shield of privity in negligence cases,9 it proceeded cautiously in aban-
doning privity in actions based on warranty. Like other jurisdictions,
it stretched agency and third-party beneficiary concepts beyond their
traditional limits to extend the benefits of warranties to persons not in
privity with the sales transaction out of which the warranty came into
existence.1 0 The problem was present in Blessington but was not dis-
cussed. In Greenberg v. Lorenz,11 the Court dealt haltingly with the
privity problem in an action by a child and his father against a retail
beneficiary and agency routes, they did not fall until Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American
Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1966). Even in Randy Knit-
wear, privity in the form of reliance on the manufacturer's representation was present.
5 Civi. PRAarcE Acr § 49(6).
6 305 N.Y. at 140, 111 N.E.2d at 422.
7 CPLR 213(2).
8 CPLR 203(a); 214(5).
9 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
10 The various strategies used by the courts are discussed in Giflam, Products Liabil-
ity in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REv. 119 (1957), and are entertainingly summarized in Prosser,
The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1124 n.153 (1960).
119 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E2d 773, 213 N.YS.2d 39 (1961).
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food store to recover damages arising from injuries sustained by the
child which resulted from eating unwholesome sardines purchased by
the father. The Court, after noting that the statutory warranties said
nothing about privity, concluded that the strict privity rule should be
revised and that warranty protection should be extended to members
of the family. However, the Court, while purporting to modify the
strict privity rule as to food and household goods purchased for family
use, clung to the privity concept by use of a presumption that the food
was purchased for all members of the household.12
The next significant inroad on the privity requirement was made
in Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.13 Randy Knitwear
manufactured clothing with fabric purchased from mills which pro-
duced cloth treated with resins manufactured and sold by American
Cyanamid for the purpose of preventing shrinkage. American Cyanamid
had widely advertised the effectiveness of its resins and had provided
labels to be passed on to clothing manufacturers by licensed textile
manufacturers. The opinion by Judge Fuld, after recounting the history
of the privity requirement in New York and noting that the require-
ment had not been adhered to with logical consistency, flatly stated the
holding in Greenberg to be that in cases of foodstuffs and other house-
hold goods the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability run
from the retailer to members of the purchaser's household, regardless
of privity of contract.14 The opinion, in concluding that the plaintiff
could recover on the basis of an express warranty without privity of
contract, again adverted to the fact that the statutory warranties no-
where state that liability for express warranty extends only to the war-
ranting seller's immediate buyer and cannot extend to a later buyer
who made the purchase in foreseeable and natural reliance upon the
original seller's affirmation. While this case purports to hold that a
seller's express warranty may extend to a remote purchaser who was not
privy to the original sale, great stress was placed on the remote buyer's
expected reliance upon the original seller's misrepresentation. 15
The crux of the problem arises from the confusion which was in-
12 Id. at 198-99, 173 N.E.2d at 775-76, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 42-43.
1s 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y..2d 363 (1962).
14 Id. at 11, 181 NE.2d at 401, 226 N.YS.2d at 366. No mention was made of the pre-
sumption that such goods are purchased for all members of the household.
15 The plaintiff's expected reliance on the original seller's misrepresentation was
not only stressed in the Court's opinion, but was also the basis of a separate concurring
opinion by Judge Froessel in which Judges Dye and Van Voorhis concurred. The concur-
ring opinion stated: "We do not agree that the so-called 'old court-made rule' should be
modified to dispense with the requirement of privity without limitation." Id. at 16, 181
N.E.d at 405, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 371.
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troduced into the New York law by Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument
Co. 16 and which has been compounded in Mendel. The majority opinion
in Mendel, written by Judge Scileppi, a dissenter in Goldberg, states:
While there is language in the majority opinion in Goldberg ap-
proving of the phrase "strict tort liability", it is dear that Goldberg
stands for the proposition that notwithstanding the absence of priv-
ity, the cause of action which exists in favor of third party strangers
to the contract is an action for breach of an implied warranty.17
Goldberg involved a suit by the administrator of a passenger
of American Airlines against Lockheed, the manufacturer and seller
of a plane which crashed and killed the plaintiff's intestate, and against
Kollsman, a supplier to Lockheed of a defective altimeter. Recovery,
without proof of negligence, was allowed against Lockheed but not
against Kollsman. Contrary to Judge Scileppi's statement in Mendel, it
is not at all clear that the recovery allowed in Goldberg was for a breach
of an implied warranty. While the majority opinion in Goldberg did
make a questionable assertion that the Randy Knitwear opinion at least
suggested that all requirements of privity had been dispensed with and
that this was the logical and necessary result of the Court's prior deci-
sions, this statement was followed immediately by a statement that "[a]
breach of warranty, it is now clear, is not only a violation of the contract
out of which ... [it] arises but is a tortious wrong suable by a non-
contracting party whose use of the warranted article is within the
reasonable contemplation of the vendor or manufacturer."' 8 Moreover,
the opinion referred to Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.19
stating: "Very recently the Supreme Court of California... in a unani-
mous opinion imposed 'strict tort liability' (surely a more accurate
phrase) regardless of privity on a manufacturer .... -20
The real clue to the basis of the holding in Goldberg is found,
however, in its conclusion that the manufacturer of the airplane, Lock-
heed, was liable and the manufacturer of the defective component
which caused the crash, Kollsman, was not. Under the warranty without
privity approach, Kollsman, as well as Lockheed, would have been
liable. But the Court's conclusion that sufficient protection to passengers
was provided "by casting in liability the airplane manufacturer which
put into the market the completed aircraft '21 clearly indicates the
16 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.YS.2d 592 (1963).
17 25 N.Y.2d at 343-44, 253 N.E.2d at 209, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
1812 N.Y.2d at 436, 191 N.E2d at 83, 240 N.YS.2d at 594.
19 59 Cal. 2d 67, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
20 12 N.Y.2d at 437, 191 N.E.2d at 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
= Id.
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adoption of a theory of strict enterprise liability, and this was explicitly
recognized in Judge Burke's dissenting opinion in Goldberg.22
The most disturbing aspect of the Mendel decision arises, not from
the result reached in the case, but from the following statement which
appears in the majority opinion:
We would merely add that both parties appear to agree, and
we believe correctly, that strict liability in tort and implied war-
ranty in the absence of privity are merely different ways of describ-
ing the very same cause of action.28
This statement can be expected to wake a sympathetic response from all
who understand that liability in warranty in the absence of privity is a
tort doctrine, pure and simple, and that the warranty label is merely
a transitional figure of speech designed to accord the same protection
to victims of defectively manufactured products who are not privy to
warranties arising from a sales transaction with another as is available
to those who can be brought under the umbrella of privity. It is sur-
prising, however, in view of Judge Scileppi's concurrence with the
dissenting opinion in Goldberg, to find flowing from his pen in Mendel
a statement that was flatly rejected in that dissent.24
More surprising, however, than Judge Scileppi's equating strict
liability in tort with liability on implied warranty without privity is the
reverse twist he applies to the statement. (n\stead of the usual meaning
that liability for implied warranty without privity is a tort liability, he
turns the phrase around to mean that strict liability in tort is a warranty
liabilitZ And from this he reasons to the conclusion that liability for
breach of warranty without privity is a liability arising from a contrac-
tual obligation within the meaning of the statute of limitations, an
amazing non sequitur.25
22 "Inherent in the question of strict products or enterprise liability is the question
of the proper enterprise on which to fasten it. Here the majority have imposed this bur-
den on the assembler of the finished product, Lookheed." Id. at 440, 191 N.E.2d at 85, 240
N.Y.S.2d at 597. Judge Scileppi, the author of the majority opinion in Mendel, which con-
tains the statement that Goldberg was clearly based on breach of implied warranty, con-
curred in Judge Burke's dissent. The dissent further argued that any claim of enterprise
liability should be fixed on American Airlines or on no one. Id. at 441, 191 N.E.2d at 86,
240 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
23 25 N.Y.2d at 345, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
24 Per Judge Burke: "We cannot accept the implication of the majority that the
difference between warranty and strict products liability is merely one of phrasing." 12
N.Y.2d at 440, 191 N.E.2d at 85, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 597.
25 Perhaps the true reason for this bizarre conclusion is contained in the last para-
graph of the opinion wherein the Court indicates that the decision to apply the contract
period of limitations was made to guard against "unfounded actions that would be brought
many years after a product is manufactured" and that plaintiff should therefore be rel-
egated to his action for negligence. 25 N.Y.2d at 346, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y..2d at
[VOL. 45:62
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It should not be forgotten that the opinions of the New York Court
in Greenberg, Randy Knitwear and Goldberg did not contend that the
New York Sales Act indicated a legislative intent to extend the statutory
warranties to noncontracting parties. Instead, the Court, recognizing
that the warranty doctrine was of tort origin, was content to point out
that the Sales Act contained no language inhibiting the Court from
expanding the warranty doctrine to persons not privy to the warranties.
Similarly, the Uniform Sales Act, which had been adopted in New
York, contained only one provision respecting the extension of statu-
tory warranties to persons other than the buyer. Section 2-318 provides
that a seller's warranty, if it exists, is extended to a limited statutorily
created class of third-party beneficiaries which includes a natural person
who is in the family or who is a member of the household of the buyer,.
or who is a guest in his home. It will be noted that this would not reach
a business invitee, a neighbor or a guest in the buyer's automobile. It
should be noted also that the statutory warranties are subject to exclu-
sion or modification. 26 It is significant also that the official comments
to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) expressly state that while
the UCC warranties (other than the third-party beneficiary provisions
in section 2-318) are limited in "scope and direct purpose to the buyer
as part of a contract of sale," the provisions are not designed to disturb
those lines of case law growth which have recognized that warranties
need not be confined either to sales contracts or to direct parties to such
contract.27 It would appear that the Code leaves the courts at liberty
to deal with liability to persons injured by defective products, whether
couched in terms of warranty or strict tort liability, free of its many
limiting features with respect to the warranties that may arise between
buyer and seller as the result of a sale.28
495. This point is adequately dealt with in the dissenting opinion and needs no further
elaboration. However, it would appear that the change in the language of the statutes of
limitations previously adverted to would have the effect of making the tort limitation
rather than the contract limitation applicable in any event. Compare CiviL PRAcncE Act
§§ 48(1) & 49(6) with CPLR 203(a), 213(2) & 214(5).
26 UNIFORM COAMERCLAL CODE § 2-316.
271d. §§ 2-313, comment 2; 2-318, comment 3.
28 For a discussioir-of-te eh-c-dusion or modification of statutory warranties under the
UCC and the limitations that may be placed thereon by the seller, see Franklin, When
Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective Product Cases, 18 STrAI'.
L. REv. 974, 992 et seq. (1966). See also L. FRUMER & M. FRIEmAN, PRODUars
LLIAiLrry § 16A(5) (1968); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YAE L.J. 1099,
1127-34 (1960) (wherein the intricacies and obstacles to recover under the UCC are elab-
orated); Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrine, 19 RuTGERs L. Rxv. 695
(1962); Shanks, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and The Uniform Commercial
Code, 17 W. RES. L. REv. 5 (1965); Speidel, The Virginia "Anti-Privity" Statute: Strict
Products Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 VA. L. REv. 804 (1965).
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An early case which dealt with the question of compliance with the
notice requirements of warranties arising under a sales act is La Hue v.
Coca-Cola Bottling, Inc.29 The Supreme Court of Washington, in hold-
ing the manufacturer liable to a consumer who was not in privity, stated
that the action for breach of implied warranty arose upon principles of
tort and that the plaintiff was not required to comply with the notice
provisions of the Uniform Sales Act.
An important point made by Justice Traynor in the celebrated
case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.30 was that, although
strict liability of a manufacturer to a person not in privity has usually
been based on the theory of a warranty running from the manufacturer
to the plaintiff, the abandonment of the requirement of a contract be-
tween the parties involves recognition that the liability is not assumed
by agreement but is imposed by law. It was therefore unnecessary for
the plaintiff to prove that a warranty was given or that the notice
requirements of the UCC were complied with.31
Although New Jersey initiated strict liability without privity under
the warranty approach in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,32 in
Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc.,13 the same Court, after noting
that the warranty approach was a sufficient basis for recovery against a
manufacturer by a purchaser from a retailer, stated that the liability
could more directly be based on tort.34 Pursuant to this view, the Court
concluded that the notice provisions of the Code were inapplicable.
In Rosenau v. New Brunswick,35 the New Jersey Court came to
grips with a problem similar to that presented in Mendel. The lower
court recognized that plaintiff's cause of action was grounded on strict
liability in tort but held that the action accrued when the defendant
29 50 Wash. 2d 645, 314 P.2d 421 (1957).
30 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
31 For additional cases holding that the notice requirements are not applicable to per-
sons not in privity, see Wright Bachman, Inc. v. Hodnett, 235 Ind. 307, 133 N.E.2d 713
(1956); Silverstein v. K. H. Macy & Co., 266 App. Div. 5, 40 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1st Dep't 1943);
Kennedy v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 205 App. Div. 648, 200 N.Y.S. 121 (1st Dep't 1923). For
a holding that the notice requirements must be met when recovery is based on the claim
of an express warranty, see Wojciuk v. U.S. Rubber Co., 19 Wis. 2d 224, 120 N.W.2d 47
(1963), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on rehearing, 19 Wis. 2d 235a, 122 N.W.2d 737
(1963). See also Annot., 6 A.L.R. 3d 1371, 1374 (1966).
32 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
33 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
34 Santor also involved the question whether strict liability should extend to the loss
of a product's value as well as to injuries or damages caused by the defect. The New Jer-
sey Court answered this question in the affirmative. But see Seeley v. White Motor Corp.,
63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965), wherein Justice Traynor rejected the
idea that Greenman had superseded the legislative warranty scheme and stated that the
development of strict tort liability was for the purpose of dealing with physical injuries.
85 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968).
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delivered a defective water meter to the city of New Brunswick, which
had subsequently installed it on the plaintiff's premises, and not when
the defective meter caused damage to plaintiff's premises. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the action was in tort and that it accrued
when the injury occurred. In so holding the Court noted that the lower
court's opinion "incongruously served to bar their claim long before
it arose and well before the meter was installed."
36
The opinion in U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co- v, Truck and Con-
crete Equipment Co.,37 decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio shortly
after Mendel, provides an interesting contrast to the majority opinion
of the New York Court. In Mendel, the contract statute of limitations
had expired but the tort statute had not. In the Ohio case, the tort
limitation period had expired but the UCC limitation for breach of
warranty had not. The Ohio Court held that the plaintiff, who was not
privy to the sale, could not rely on the longer UCC limitation appli-
cable to warranties and that his action was barred by the shorter period
applicable to torts. The Court said that plaintiff's action was "in tort
based upon the breach of an implied warranty." 38
Courts which have candidly recognized that the liability of a
remote manufacturer or supplier of defectively dangerous products is
a tort doctrine rather than a fictional warranty liability have generally
recognized that the tort statute of limitations is applicable and that the
action accrues when the injury occurs.3.This approach makes it un-
necessary to examine the terms of the manufacturer's sales contract or
that of intermediate or mediate vendors to determine what warranties
were included, whether the statutory warranties were excluded or
modified and whether the buyer's remedies were contractually limite4)
Also eliminated is a whole congery of complex choice of law problems
inherent in the contract warranty approach of the New York Court in
Mendel.40 Since the distributive chain of merchandising often involves
sellers in several states and even in foreign countries, and since the
terms of various sales may differ; the remedies available to an injured
person may be affected by differences in the applicable law relating to
361d. at 136, 238 A.2d at 176. The Court, recognizing the hardship on the defendant
of defending his actions of many years before, conceded that it would be more undesirable
and unjust to bar a plaintiff's remedy before his cause of action existed.
37 21 Ohio St. 2d 244, 257 N.E.2d 380 (1970).
38 Id. at 251-52, 257 N.E2.d at 384.
89 Holifield v. Setco Indus., Inc., 42 Wis. 2d 750, 168 N.W.2d 177 (1969); Williams v.
Brown Mfg. Co., 93 Ill. App. 2d 334, 236 N.E.2d 125 (1969). See L. FRuMER & M. FRUan-
MaN, supra note 28. _
40 See Comment, Manufacturer's Responsibility for Defective Products: Continuing
Controversy Over the Law to be Applied, 54 CAv7. L. Rrv. 1681 (1966).
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the interpretation of the various sales contracts, by the question of
where the sale was consummated, by attempted exclusions or modifica-
tion of warranties, by the consequences of contractual limitations of
remedies, by questions relative to the statutory requirement of notice of
breach, and by the necessity of determining whether the place of the
contract's consummation or the place of performance is applicable to
one or more of these problems. The resolution of these problems might
result in liability for an intermediate vendor which could not be passed
upward to his supplier or it might defeat an action against an imme-
diate vendor which would lie against the manufacturer seller.
Mendel, by expanding the concept of the reach of warranty beyond
Randy Knitwear, where emphasis was placed on the remote buyer's
reliance on the manufacturer's express representations, and beyond
Goldberg, where the victim of the defective product was a user thereof,
to a mere bystander who was in the foreseeable ambit of danger, indi-
cates that the Court has heard and heeded the tolling of the tocsin 4'
of privity, but the majority opinion, in turning its back on Goldberg,
has, it is submitted, misinterpreted the import of its warning. If the
protection of all who are in the ambit of danger from defectively sup-
plied products is to be accomplished by placing responsibility upon the
suppliers of such products, it is essential that the escape hatches which
are available to suppliers under the warranty nomenclature be dosed
and nailed shut. The Greenman doctrine and the progeny of that
imaginative decision provide the tools necessary to accomplish this
purpose. The barrier thrown up in the majority opinion in Mendel,
and which was so effectively weakened by the dissenting opinion, will,
it is predicted, be swept away by the mounting tide of decisions which
recognize the justice of placing the cost of injury and damage caused
by defective products upon those who place them in the stream of com-
merce. This is but a logical extension of the MacPherson doctrine,
which accomplishes this result when negligence can be proved, since
liability for negligence may itself be liability without actual fault of the
manufacturer. 42
The argument that hardship on the manufacturer-supplier re-
quires the statute of limitations to begin running when the product is
41 See Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded, 1 DUQUESNE L. REv. 1
(1963).
42 The doctrine of respondeat superior, under which a manufacturer is vicariously
liable for the negligence of its employees, obviously does not contemplate that a manufac-
turer is at fault unless all employees continuously exerdse due care. See Ehrenzweig, Neg-
ligence Without Fault, 54 CALF. L. REv. 1422 (1966); Keeton, Products Liability -Problems
Pertaining to Proof of Negligence, 19 Sw. L.J. 26, 39-42 (1965); Wade, Strict Tort Liabil-
ity of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 8 (1965).
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first sold applies equally to an action for negligence. In either case, the
injury or damage to a victim of the product may occur long after the
original sale and in either case the manufacturer may find it difficult
to disprove the claim that the product was defective. However, the
burden of proof will be on the plaintiff, whether proof of the defect is
attempted in a negligence action or in one based on a strict tort liability
theory.
Indeed, the additional difficulty encountered by a plaintiff in
proving negligence, as well as the original defectiveness of the product,
is the raison d'dtre of the strict liability doctrine. Therefore, to use dif-
ficulty of proof as a reason for applying a statute of limitation which
would bar recovery before the injury giving rise to the action occurred,
is both incongruous and indefensible.
